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Backward induction and the game-theoretic analysis of chess
Abstract
The paper scrutinizes various stylized facts related to the minmax theorem for chess. We first point out
that, in contrast to the prevalent understanding, chess is actually an infinite game, so that backward
induction does not apply in the strict sense. Second, we recall the original argument for the minmax
theorem of chess - which is forward rather than backward looking. Then it is shown that, alternatively,
the minmax theorem for the infinite version of chess can be reduced to the minmax theorem of the
usually employed finite version. The paper concludes with a comment on Zermelo's (1913)
non-repetition theorem.
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2ABSTRACT
The paper scrutinizes various stylized facts related to the minmax theorem for chess. We first
point out that, in contrast to the prevalent understanding, chess is actually an infinite game, so
that backward induction does not apply in the strict sense. Second, we recall the original
argument for the minmax theorem of chess – which is forward rather than backward looking.
Then it is shown that, alternatively, the minmax theorem for the infinite version of chess can
be reduced to the minmax theorem of the usually employed finite version. The paper
concludes with a comment on Zermelo’s  (1913) non-repetition theorem.
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31. Introduction
The classic paper of Zermelo (1913) has long been thought to contain a complete statement
and proof of one of the first theorems of game theory, namely the minmax theorem for chess.
This theorem asserts that either White has a winning strategy, or Black has a winning strategy,
or both players can individually ensure a draw. However, a recent analysis by Schwalbe and
Walker (2001) revealed that Zermelo’s paper, while containing the base idea, does not make a
formal statement of this theorem. Instead, Kalmár (1928/29) seemingly was the first to state
and prove this fundamental result.1
We believe that this discovery casts doubts on existing “folk knowledge” concerning
the history of game theory and in particular concerning the game-theoretic analysis of chess.
Motivated by the strong historical relevance of chess to the theory of games, but also by the
conceptual importance of backward induction, this paper intends to scrutinize various stylized
facts in connection with what became known as “Zermelo’s Theorem.”
To this end, we first point out that, in view of the official game laws, as provided by
the World Chess Federation, chess is in fact an infinite game, so that backward induction does
not deliver the minmax theorem in this game. Second, we recall the original argument of
Kalmár (1928/29) for the minmax theorem of the infinite version of chess. Buried in a
somehow technical paper, his simple method of proof, which is forward rather than backward
looking, seems to be largely unknown. Then, it is shown that the minmax theorem for the
infinite version of chess can alternatively be deduced from the minmax theorem of the usually
employed finite version, which ends in a draw when a position appeared the third time. The
paper concludes with a comment on Zermelo’s (1913) non-repetition theorem.
42. The official rules of chess
Game theorists often assume that chess is finite. See, e.g., Binmore (1992), Osborne and
Rubinstein (1994), or Mycielski (1992). However, strictly speaking, this is not the case.
According to the official FIDE laws of chess, there is no rule or combination of rules that
generally ends a game after a finite number of moves (cf. FIDE, 2000). Most importantly, it is
not true that a game ends in a draw as soon as a position has appeared the third time. What is
true is that a player may claim to end the game in a draw either if he is about to make a move
to, or if he finds himself at a position that appeared the third time (not necessarily by
repetition of moves).
Similarly, there is no official rule that generally terminates the game when the number
of moves exceeds a given limit. Instead, there are two rules. The first says that a player may
claim to end the game in a draw if he declares his intention to make a move that leads to, or
finds himself at a position with the property that the last 50 (two-player) moves have been
made without the movement of any pawn and without the capture of any piece. The second
rule in fact ends the game effectively without the need for a player to make a claim, yet only
under the condition that a position is reached from where a checkmate cannot occur by any
possible series of legal moves, even with the most unskilled play (e.g., when solely the kings
are left on the board).
Given these rules, it is easy to construct an infinite path in chess. E.g., from the initial
position, both players could alternatingly draw their respective right-wing horse out and back
in - as many times as they wish. Other, less trivial examples can be constructed easily. Von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, p. 60) mention the feasibility of indefinite “non-periodic”
5repetitions.2 It will be noted that, however senseless any specific infinite play may seem, the
possibility of infinite paths alone makes chess an infinite game.3
3. The minmax theorem for potentially infinite chess-like games
The minmax theorem for chess and similar games was very likely documented first by
Kalmár (1928/29). The original paper’s exposition, however, is probably not very accessible,
in particular because the paper is written in German, because it does not use modern
terminology, and because its scope requires the use of the somehow sophisticated method of
transfinite induction. Moreover, according to Schwalbe and Walker (2001), there does not
exist a usable English translation of Kalmár’s paper. Schwalbe and Walker give a summary of
Kalmár’s paper, yet leave out the details of the argument that lead to the minmax theorem.
Hence, at present, there seems to exist no simple, accessible exposition of the minmax
theorem for standard infinite board games such as chess. To fill this gap, we will define a
class of infinite games, one of which is the infinite version of chess, and recall Kalmár’s
argument that any game in this class has a value.
In this paper, all games are two-player strictly competitive (for definitions of the
standard notions used from now on, see, e.g., Binmore, 1992). We will say that a node has
height n if there are precisely n moves necessary to reach this node (throughout the paper,
unless otherwise stated, we use the game-theoretic definition of a move as an action of just
one player, and not the definition common in the chess literature, where a move consists of
two consecutive actions by White and Black.) By a potentially infinite chess-like game, we
mean a strictly competitive perfect-information game with at most three outcomes in which
6each node has finite height and a finite number of immediate successors, and in which any
infinite path yields a draw. Note that when infinite plays are declared to be draws (as was
proposed by Zermelo, 1913), then the official version of chess is a potentially infinite chess-
like game.
As will become clear below, the following theorem immediately implies the minmax
assertion for chess.4 According to Kalmár (1928/29), this result and its corollary were known
already to John von Neumann.5
Theorem 1. (Kalmár) Consider any potentially infinite chess-like game G. Then, if player i
cannot enforce a win, then player j can ensure at least a draw.
We will say that a node x is a non-winning position for i when there does not exist a winning
strategy for player i in the subgame starting at x.
Proof. Note first that, when j is called upon to play at a position x, that is non-winning for i,
then there must exist an immediate successor node of x that is non-winning for i. To see why,
assume to the contrary, in any subgame starting at some immediate successor node of x,
player i can choose a winning strategy. Then, in the subgame starting at x, a grand strategy
composed of these strategies in the respective subgames will be a winning strategy for i. This,
however, contradicts our assumption that x is non-winning for i. Thus, whenever player j
moves at a node x that is non-winning for i, there is an immediate successor node that is also
non-winning for i.
We can therefore define player j‘s action at any such x in the searched-for strategy by
the requirement that it leads to an immediate successor node that is non-winning for i. At all
7other nodes in G, choose any of the feasible actions for j. This defines a strategy s for player j.
Now we claim that any path p generated by s and some strategy of i yields at least a draw for
j. This is clear for any infinite path. Assume therefore that p is finite. We will show that the
terminal node of p must be non-winning for i, and therefore yield at least a draw for j. Note
first that, by assumption, the initial node of G is non-winning for i. Hence, it suffices to show
that if x is non-winning for i, the immediate successor node of x on p has the same property.
This is clear for any x, at which j is called upon to play, because j’s strategy was precisely
defined that way. But this is also true for any node x at which it is i’s turn, because, if i had
available a winning strategy in a subgame starting at some immediate successor node w of x,
this strategy could be complemented, in a way that i moves from x to w, to a strategy of i in
the subgame starting at x. As w was arbitrary, this shows that any sucessor node of x is non-
winning for i. This proves the theorem. ¶
Theorem 1 is essentially Kalmár’s “Satz III”.6 It will be noted that the idea of the proof is
forward rather than backward-looking. The draw-ensuring strategy for player j requires j,
whenever the current position is a non-winning position for i, to make a move to some other
non-winning position for i (this is always feasible, as the proof shows). As the initial position
is assumed to be non-winning for i, this requirement in fact defines a strategy for j that
ensures at least a draw.
Theorem 1 implies immediately that the infinite version of chess (in fact, any
potentially infinite chess-like game) has a value, i.e., either White has a winning strategy, or
Black has a winning strategy, or both can ensure themselves a draw, but not more. To see
why, note first that, trivially, White and Black cannot both have a winning strategy. So either
White has a winning strategy, or Black, or none has a winning strategy. But if no player
8possesses a winning strategy, then by Kalmár’s theorem, both can individually ensure a draw.
This proves the assertion.
In a companion paper in this journal (Ewerhart, 2000), I show that any finite chess-like
game, i.e., any finite, strictly competitive perfect-information games with at most three
outcomes can be reduced to a trivial game (i.e., all outcomes are equivalent) by two rounds of
elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Since the minmax theorem is valid also for the
infinite version of chess, and any infinite play yields a draw, this result and its proof extend
straightforwardly to any potentially infinite chess-like game, and in particular to the infinite
version of chess.
4. Backward induction
It is natural to suggest that the infinite version of chess is in some sense strategically
equivalent to some finite version, and that the value of chess is therefore deducible via
backward induction. We find below that this intuition can be made precise.
We first give a more formal description of the common finite version of chess. Being a
board game, infinite chess has a finite number L of positions (to be precise: positions are
considered the same, if the same player has the move, pieces of the same kind and color
occupy the same squares, and the possible moves of all the pieces of both players are the
same. Positions are not the same if a pawn could have been captured en passant or if the right
to castle immediately or in the future has been changed.) Hence, on any path p with more than
2L positions there is at least one position appearing the third time. Consider the first node x on
the path p that corresponds to a third-time appearance of a position. Denote by X the set of all
9nodes in the infinite version of chess that can be obtained in that way. Let i be the player that
is called upon to make a move at x. Clearly, x is not the initial node. Denote by y the node
played by player j prior to some x∈X. Let Y be the set of all nodes y in the infinite version of
chess that can be obtained in that way. By the official rules, j has the option to end the game
in a draw at y, and i has the option to end the game in a draw at x. In the finite version of
chess, the options at x and y are removed, and x is made into a terminal node that ends the
game in a draw, for any x∈X, and any y∈Y.
Theorem 2. A player’s value in the infinite version of chess is the same as his value in the
finite version (that demands that the game ends in a draw as soon as a position appears the
third time).
The proof is essentially straightforward. Any strategy in the infinite version of chess that
ensures a win (draw) will induce a strategy with the same property in the finite version.
Conversely, any strategy ensuring a win (draw) in the finite version can be complemented and
modified to become a strategy with the same property in the infinite game, with the sole
complication that in the case of a strategy that ensures a draw, the player in the infinite game
will have to exploit all of his options to end the game.
Proof. Note first that the removal of the option at y is strategically irrelevant in the finite
game, so that the finite game can be considered as a truncated game of the infinite version in
the sense that all nodes in X are declared terminal. Then, any strategy in the infinite game
induces a strategy in the finite game in a natural way. The proof proceeds in four steps.
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I) Assume that player i has a winning strategy in the infinite game. This strategy induces
a winning strategy in the finite game. To see why, consider any strategy of j in the
finite game. This strategy can be complemented to some strategy in the infinite game.
Given that player i uses his winning strategy in the infinite game, player j’s strategy
does not reach any node x∈X, because otherwise j would have the option, either at x or
at the node preceding x, to end the game in a draw. But this cannot be the case as i
uses a winning strategy in the infinite game. Thus, the strategy for i in the finite game,
that is induced by i’s winning strategy in the infinite game, wins against any of j’s
strategies, and is therefore itself a winning strategy.
II) Assume that i can ensure a draw in the infinite game by use of some strategy. We
claim that this strategy induces a draw-ensuring strategy in the finite game. To see
why, consider any strategy of j in the finite game. This strategy can be complemented
to some strategy in the infinite game. There are two cases.
a. Assume that the original strategy of i in the infinite game together with j’s
complemented strategy does not reach any node in X. Then it is clear that the
induced strategy for i in the finite game yields at least a draw against j’s original
strategy.
b. Assume now to the contrary that the draw-ensuring strategy of i together with the
complemented strategy of j in the infinite game does reach some node in X. Then,
by definition of the truncated game, the induced strategy for i yields a draw against
j’s original strategy.
Thus, if i can ensure a draw in the infinite game, he can also ensure a draw in the finite
game.
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III) Assume now that i has a winning strategy in the finite game. Then this strategy can be
complemented to a strategy in the infinite game in some way. We claim that the
complemented strategy is a winning strategy in the infinite game. To see why,
consider any strategy for j in the infinite game. This strategy induces a strategy for j in
the finite game, against which player i’s original strategy yields a win. But then
clearly, as the path that leads to i’s win does not reach any node in X (otherwise, the
path would end in a draw in the finite game), player i’s complemented strategy yields
a win against player j’s strategy in the infinite game. This proves the assertion.
IV) Finally, assume that i has a strategy that ensures a draw in the finite game.
Complement this strategy to some strategy in the infinite game. Modify the resulting
strategy in a way such that i chooses the option to end the game in a draw at all of his
nodes in X or Y. Consider any strategy for j in the infinite game. Then clearly this
strategy induces a strategy in the finite game, against which the original strategy of i
ensures a draw. As above, there are two cases.
a. The path in the finite game does not reach a node in X. Then clearly, i’s modified
strategy in the infinite game yields at least a draw for i.
b. The path in the finite game reaches some node x∈X. Then, in the infinite game,
player i exerts his option to end the game at either x or at the preceding node y.
Thus, if i can ensure a draw in the finite game, he can also ensure a draw in the infinite
game.
Summing up, we have shown that i can ensure a win (draw) in the finite game if and only if i
can ensure a win (draw) in the infinite game. This implies the theorem. ¶
12
Using the minmax theorem in finite games (see, e.g., Binmore, 1992), Theorem 2 implies the
existence of a value in the infinite version of chess. Moreover, the result shows that it is
unambigous to use the term “value of chess,” and that this value can, at least theoretically, be
determined via backward induction or iterated weak dominance in the finite version.
Appendix. A comment on Zermelo’s non-repetition theorem
In Zermelo (1913) it is proved that if a player in chess has a winning strategy, then he can
enforce to win in a number of moves that is smaller than the number of positions of chess.
Later, König (1927) found and corrected an error in Zermelo’s proof. In this section, we
comment on the definition of a “position” in this literature.
There are only finitely many positions in chess, where a position is defined as in
section 4. To account for claims that may be made by a chess player, define the z-position of a
node in chess as a quadruple consisting of the position corresponding to that node, the set of
positions that appeared precisely once before, the set of positions that appeared at least twice
before, and the minimum of 100 and the number of moves (counting each player separately)
that have been made without any movement of any pawn and without the capture of any
piece. Then it is clear from the rules of chess that any two subgames starting at nodes with
equal z-positions are isomorphic. Since there is only a finite number of positions, and the
power set of a finite set is again finite, the total number of z-positions is finite. For Zermelo’s
argument in König’s paper (1927), which is conveniently summarized in Schwalbe and
Walker (2001), to be valid, the definition of a “position” should correctly be that of a z-
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position. Thus, in an adapted form, Zermelo’s main theorem in his 1913 paper can be stated as
follows.
Theorem 3. (Zermelo) If a player can enforce a win in chess, then he can do so in less than t
moves, where t is the number of z-positions.
Proof. See text above. ¶
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Footnotes
1) Also, Kalmár was first (among Zermelo, König, and himself) to provide an explicit
definition of a strategy notion (“Taktik”).
2) It seems that Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) took an overall “liberal” position on the
rules of chess, in the sense that they realized the possibility of paths of infinite length in the
official version, but found it also appropriate to use additional rules which make the game
finite.
3) Of course, the rules of chess have changed over time. According to Myron Lieberman
(personal communication), International Arbiter for FIDE and National Tournament Director
for the USCF (the US Chess Federation), by the end of the 19th century countries had
significant differences in their rules. This period, however, ended with the first publication of
the FIDE Laws of Chess in the year 1929. The draw rules of that time appear less accurately
formulated, but otherwise different from the current ones only in details. Specifically, the fifty
move count was apparently not reset by the move of a pawn, but only when a piece has been
captured. Also, there was the explicit possibility of a claimed draw by perpetual check. Note
that these modifications do not affect the potential infinity of chess. The rules remained
unchanged until 1952, so that they appear to be the most relevant set of rules for von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s work on chess.
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4) Even so, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) do not reference any of the earlier papers,
except for König which they cite to prove the finiteness of the game tree when there is a stop
rule.
5) Referring to his Satz II, which is a statement of the minmax corollary, and which he derives
from the subsequent Satz III, Kalmár (1928/29, Footnote 17) writes: “As Herr König kindliest
communicated to me subsequently, this proposition was known also to Herr v. Neumann.”
6) Our formulation differs from the original in two respects. Firstly, Kalmár (1928/29)
considers more general games. Specifically, he allows nodes of infinite height (this is not
more general than our setting as Kalmár also defines infinite paths as draws), and also an
infinite number of immediate successors of a given node (this would require the use of the
axiom of choice in our setting, which is unnecessary in Kalmár’s paper because his notion of
a “Taktik” does not require a specification of a unique action at each relevant node, as the
modern notions of strategy, pure strategy and plan of action, do). The second difference is
that, for a given game, Satz III is slightly stronger than Theorem 1. Specifically, Satz III says
that if player i cannot enforce a win, then player j can ensure at least a draw using a “Taktik”
that depends only on the respective board position, not on the whole history of the play.
